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ABSTRACT
Recent advances in the research of usable security have produced 
many new security mechanisms that improve usability. However, 
these mechanisms have not been widely adopted in practice. In 
most organisations, IT security managers decide on security 
policies and mechanisms, seemingly without considering 
usability. IT security managers consider risk reduction and the 
business impact of information security controls, but not the 
impact that controls have on users. Rather than trying to remind 
security managers of usability, we present a new paradigm – a 
stealth approach which incorporates the impact of security 
controls on users’ productivity and willingness to comply into 
business impact and risk reduction. During two 2-hour sessions, 3 
IT security managers discussed with us mock-up tool prototypes 
that embody these principles, alongside a range of potential usage 
scenarios (e.g. cloud-based password-cracking attacks and “hot-
desking” initiatives). Our tool design process elicits findings to 
help develop mechanisms to visualise these tradeoffs.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.1.2 [Models and Principles]: Human/Machine Systems – 
human factors, human information processing. C.2.0 [Computer 
Communication Networks] General –security and protection  
General Terms
Management, Security, Human Factors.  
Keywords
Information security, usability, security policies, passwords  
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past 10 years, there has been a significant body of 
research focused on improving the usability of security 
mechanisms (e.g. [23], [24], [25]).  
Some effort has been made to understand the nature of usability 
problems with existing authentication mechanisms, such as 
passwords. Adams & Sasse’s “Users are not the Enemy” [6] 
detailed how users were struggling with the number and 
complexity of passwords, and the impact of these problems on 
their productivity and attitudes to security. Since then, significant 
effort has been dedicated to providing alternative, more usable 
authentication mechanisms. These range from graphical 
authentication mechanisms (e.g. [27], [29], [30]), to video 
authentication (e.g. [31]), to more unusual forms of authentication 
through brainwaves [32] and singing at the computer [33]. 
Commercially, there has been significant investment in biometrics 
to replace passwords with authentication via fingerprints.  
However, most of this research effort and commercial investment 
has made little difference in practice.  In a recent study on 
password use in organisations [34] it was found that, 10 years 
after the “Users Are Not the Enemy” paper, little has changed: 
single sign-on is at best partially implemented, there are short 
timeouts on services leading to a need for frequent re-
authentication, and users are still required to generate complex 
passwords without regard to how it addresses the real threats.  
Enforced password changes interrupt users at inconvenient times; 
they have to expend time and effort to generate and memorise 
new passwords. If single sign-on is not properly implemented 
they may also be ‘locked out’ while a new password is propagated 
[34].  
Even where single-sign on mechanisms exist, legacy systems and 
increasing use of 3rd party services mean that individual users still 
have a high number of passwords to cope with. The consequence 
of this reality is that users are forced to organise their primary 
tasks around the password mechanism. With the increase in e-
commerce, web-mail and other online services, users now have 
even more passwords in use than 10 years ago. Florencio & 
Herley [36] found that, considering only web-based services, the 
average user has an average of 25 web accounts – since users 
cope by re-using passwords across several accounts, they have an 
average of 6.5 passwords each. 
Within organisations, interviews with security decision makers 
(conducted as part of the Trust Economics project [35]) confirmed 
that the usability of security mechanisms, and any resulting 
impact on end-user productivity, is generally not considered when 
security policies are decided and security mechanisms chosen [7]. 
Herley [28] argues that security decision-makers “treat the user’s 
attention and effort as an unlimited resource. … Each piece of 
advice may carry benefit, but the burden is cumulative”.  User 
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something that users are aware of and resent, leading them to 
circumvent security mechanisms whenever possible [6, 7]. 
So why are we not seeing the output from usable security research 
adopted in practice? Are those in charge of security in 
organisations still ignorant about the impact that security 
measures have on individuals?  Do they know, but simply not 
care about the impact that security policies have on users? Our 
research with those who decide information security policies – 
generally referred to here as Chief Security Information Officers 
(CISOs) – has established that this is not necessarily the case. 
Rather, they do not know how to apply research findings on the 
usability and economic impact of security measures when making 
a decision about a specific security policy or measure.  
This led us to consider CISOs as a user; rather than trying to 
educate them about usable security, we took the stealth approach 
of packaging and presenting knowledge of the impacts that 
security has upon users within a tool that CISOs can draw on 
during the security management decision-making process, to 
make more informed choices about the security mechanisms they 
deploy within their organisations. 
CISOs need to justify policy decisions to senior managers and 
other stakeholders within the organisation and communicate their 
decisions in appropriate language. An example of a process 
modelling tool that provides an integrated treatment of usability 
and business process factors within information security 
management can be found in [10]. The modelling tool accounts 
for the risk mitigation achieved not only through a security 
policy, but also through consideration of usability and 
productivity. However, the model is an abstract trade-off of 
investment and operating costs vs. risk mitigation achieved. To 
effectively support CISOs in their decision-making: 
• The model needs to be populated with data on the cost
and benefit of specific security measures, and;
• There needs to be an interface that allows CISOs to
explore the impact of security policies on their
organisation, in an interactive fashion.
In this paper we describe, through the design of a graphical user 
interface (GUI), a prototype tool that provides an integrated 
security, usability and economic perspective of information 
security policy management for use by CISOs. The tool design 
exposes the human-behavioural and economic implications of 
observable, measurable information security policy decisions 
during policy review and management, while grounding 
information in terms that resonate with CISOs.  To ensure that the 
design would deliver these fundamental aspects, we arranged for a 
small group of CISOs to participate in a user-centred design 
process. 
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 
examines existing information security procedures and related 
work. Section 3 describes the methodology and notable results of 
our CISO consultations. Section 4 then details the design of the 
tool as applied to an example of password composition policy. 
Discussion of issues uncovered by the tool design follow in 
Section 5, with concluding remarks and thoughts on future work 
closing the paper in Section 6. 
2. BACKGROUND
A number of areas of research and commercial interest offer 
insights that are pertinent to the work described here. 
2.1 Usability and Compliance 
The impact of usability problems with security on individual and 
organisational productivity has been highlighted previously.  One 
of the first investigations into usability problems with passwords 
was prompted by the escalating cost of helpdesks for password 
resets [6], and established the number and complexity of 
password policies as a cause.  This early investigation also found 
that the difficulty users experienced reduced their willingness to 
comply – a finding confirmed in a more recent study [7]. 
In [7] a more formalised model was developed, linking the effort 
required to comply with security mechanisms to the level of 
compliance achieved. Herley [28] investigated the link between 
effort required to comply and actual risk reduction achieved, 
concluding that the decision taken by most users – to not follow 
security advice – is rational from an economic point of view, 
because the effort required to follow those rules is not worth 
expending for the risk reduction achieved. Ignoring the real cost 
of users’ attention and effort is a stance that does not work with 
external customers, and is even more untenable in a corporate 
context. 
2.2 Human Aspects of Information Security 
The use of checklists is generally no substitute for a thorough 
understanding of risk, as emphasised by the ISO 27001 standard 
[40]. Information security cannot be reduced to “box-ticking”, 
and in particular, must take into account perception of risks by 
organisational members and their security-related behaviour [21]. 
It has long been recognised that security policies cannot be seen 
as simply technical measures; to achieve their business objectives, 
they must consider the organisational, cultural, technological, and 
human elements as a dynamically interconnected system [15]. 
Security mechanisms which fail to take into account the impact 
on the business processes or the users’ primary tasks are 
potentially unusable, and are likely to be circumvented by users, 
thus creating new vulnerabilities [21], such as users writing 
passwords down insecurely to compensate for the increased 
cognitive workload of increasingly complex authentication 
credentials [44]. 
2.3 Usability of Security Interfaces 
Usability is also central to the interfaces used to manage security. 
Whitten & Tygar [41] found that interfaces for security 
implementations are unusable, even by highly computer-literate 
users (based on a case study of PGP 5.0). Security mechanisms 
are therefore either unused, or worse still may be used incorrectly 
and so fail to provide the intended protection. 
If this is so for tools aimed at users in general, it is no less so for 
tools intended for security professionals. The importance of the 
usability of tools for security practitioners has been recognised, 
for example by [12], [14], [42]. However, perhaps because they 
focus more on policy implementers such as system administrators 
alongside policy-makers, this earlier research concentrates on 
those aspects – primarily technical – which are of concern to 
practitioners. 
Nohlberg & Backström [5] investigate delivery of information 
security policy information to an organisation’s upper-level 
management. The need to tailor pertinent decision-making 
information to intended users was considered, by way of 
interviews of potential users and scenario-driven design that 
contributed to a staged interface design. The nature of the 
intended users served to frame security from a financial and 
strategic perspective. We concentrate here on using interface 
design as a means to elicit CISO perspectives on the relationships 
between security, usability and economic factors. 
Our aim is to go beyond providing a tool to support the ways that 
security professionals work currently, to encourage them to take a 
more holistic approach, considering the costs to users as well as 
the benefits of security policies. Any tool developed to achieve 
this must be usable for the CISO if it is to equally improve 
usability from the point of view of the people who are expected to 
comply with security policies. 
2.4 Using Tools to Explore Options 
In describing our interface as a tool, we emphasise that a tool 
places the user and their task at the centre: “the tool itself seems to 
disappear” [26] – the objects of interest are displayed such that 
the user remains in the “high level” semantic domain. The CISO 
acts through the interface on the objects of interest [39]. 
Although in a very different application area, our tool draws on 
visualisation as a way to enable exploration in a manner which is 
inspired by the Homefinder tool [11]. The interface, using sliders 
and graphical output, allows users to explore the impact of 
changing one or more parameters of their decision-making. 
Visualisation enables the exploration and understanding of 
complex interactions of variables [16]. As in other complex 
decision-making processes, humans are prone to conceptual or 
execution errors and to forgetting key items of information. 
Visualisation can help to avoid these classes of human error. In 
this case, the objects of interest are themselves relatively abstract 
concepts relating to parameters of security policy, so another 
design aim is to use visualisation to concretise these concepts. 
Finally, visualisations also support communication [16] of tool 
output, which is important for CISOs looking for support from 
other senior managers. 
2.5 Modelling the Human Factor in 
Information Security within Organisations 
A number of modelling tools have been developed to encourage 
information security professionals to articulate policies within 
their organisations and foster a holistic decision-making approach 
in light of the increasingly strategic role of the CISO. 
An integrated approach to information security management 
incorporating human factors and economics principles has been 
demonstrated within previous research ([9], [10]), investigating 
the use of USB devices by employees. By characterising a user’s 
working locations and the security threats to data on a USB 
device, the authors determined that improper use of USB devices 
can result in a mixture of increased business flexibility and 
potentially costly breaches. 
Shay & Bertino [14] provide a simulation model for investigating 
trade-offs within the technical and human factors of password 
policies for users. The model is framed by an end-user's 
perception of an IT environment, modelling their interactions with 
various services and associated user accounts. This approach 
allows the authors to characterise users’ attempts to memorise 
passwords for various accounts while they remain vigilant for 
signs of suspected attacks upon those accounts. Formalisation of 
password policy attributes and associated costs to the organisation 
– such as helpdesk support – expose the relationship between end-
user password usage and the economic impacts of a particular 
password policy. The work exposes the need to balance security 
and usability for user passwords, for instance in terms of 
password character complexity. 
Beresnevichiene et al [17] augment the CISO's decision-making 
process with mathematical modelling tools. A structured process 
of problem elicitation leads to identification of a CISO’s policy 
preferences and utility, in terms of breach prevention, assurance, 
and business performance. This thereby characterises competing 
objectives, which in turn informs creation of a model to 
investigate policy trade-offs relating business processes, 
environmental factors and use of resources. A case study 
considers the activities of users in a scenario centred on the use of 
SLA-assured services by third party employees, including 
associated support services. Modelling results identify that CISOs 
can achieve comparable security outcomes by balancing a 
multitude of security and process controls.  
The aim of the tool described in this paper is to build upon these 
research findings in the design of a tool to support security 
decision-making. 
3. CONSULTATIONS
To effectively augment the process of deciding information 
security policies, we must first understand the CISO’s goals and 
tasks, and how these influence their decision-making. To develop 
this understanding, we consulted three information security 
managers. Two of these CISOs (who we will refer to as C1 and 
C2) have a wealth of experience working for large multi-national 
organisations in the financial sector. CISO C3 is in an information 
security management position at a leading UK university. 
Although this is a small group, the range of viewpoints 
represented provided us with sufficient insight into CISO goals, 
tasks and decision-making for us to inform a prototype interface. 
3.1 Methodology 
We structured the CISO consultations so that we could relate the 
insights of individual CISOs across similar points of discussion, 
comparing responses to build a more detailed picture of the policy 
management process and how it may be enhanced by an 
appropriate policy management tool. The consultation process 
was conducted in two stages, as described here. 
Both stages centred on paper-printed “mock-ups” of prototype 
screens representing our proposed CISO interaction tool, created 
in drawing software [37]. We printed these in large scale and 
encouraged participants to interact with the mock-ups in 
describing how they might use our tool to investigate the 
implications of various information security events. 
3.1.1 Semi-structured requirements analysis 
This first stage constituted an informal walkthrough of a 
preliminary tool design. The interdependencies that we 
investigate in this work have rarely (if ever) been adequately 
exposed before in a form with which CISOs can make policy 
decisions. With that, choosing to approach CISOs with a tool 
design provided something tangible to discuss with the CISOs, 
around which they could articulate their thoughts. The tool design 
was inspired by the functionality of a process model being 
developed in tandem within the Trust Economics project [35].  
Within this initial consultation we also introduced some general 
decision-making scenarios within which CISOs could potentially 
use the tool, so as to identify appropriate functional boundaries 
and understand the environment that the tool could be used in. 
3.1.2 Scenario-driven design 
A second set of consultations with the same CISOs considered 
how a functioning instance of the tool would be applied. The 
initial meetings served to clarify how CISOs express the 
interdependencies that we consider in this work, and it was 
necessary to go further to examine how these interdependencies 
aligned with policy- and environment-specific attributes in well-
defined usage scenarios (e.g. maintenance costs of IT systems, 
ease of changing existing policies). 
At this stage we focused attention on the scenarios that were 
discussed with the CISOs. The intention was to expose 
interdependencies as they exist in practice, and examine how 
contributory factors may be formalised and quantified. Associated 
discussion facilitated investigation of how manipulating these 
factors could be seen to have both positive and negative impacts 
upon the functioning of the organisation in a given situation. This 
then provided insights into the effective exposure of these 
interdependencies to inform and augment existing CISO 
knowledge. 
We structured pre- and in situ- prompts specific to each scenario, 
to (1) understand any existing thinking about the 
interdependencies, and (2) align exposure of the 
interdependencies within the tool with the policy decision-making 
process.  
The scenarios we described to CISOs are specific to the 
management of password composition policies, and are included 
in Appendix A. A brief description and the main exploratory 
theme of each scenario are as follows: 
1. “Password Cracking in the Cloud” (e.g. [22]): “How do
policy choices affect the organisation?”
2. “Introduction of Hot-Desking”: “How do working
practices affect security?”
3. “Passwords vs. Fingerprints”: “How are business cases
formulated and supported?”
3.2 Analysis 
The consultations with CISOs were voice- and video-recorded. 
The video recordings enabled us to capture interactions which 
CISOs were encouraged to make with the paper mockups. 
The voice recordings were transcribed and analysed using a 
variation on Grounded Theory [19]. Initial line-by-line coding 
produced 349 basic open codes. These were gathered around 21 
core codes; open codes and core codes were finally drawn 
together in groups of codes capturing thematic relationships. 
For example, we developed three code groups on themes of: 
“About the CISO”, “About Users”, and “About Passwords” (since 
our initial study took password policy as its object of focus). 
“About the CISO” contained codes such as “CISO is not [mainly] 
technical” – the position of the CISO in an organisation – and 
“what matters to the CISO”. “About Users” gathered codes which 
marked points in the consultations in which CISOs discussed our 
concept of classifying users into classes (see section 4.1). 
Our analysis produced the following findings which have 
implications for the design of the tool. 
3.2.1 The CISO’s Concern is to Support the Business 
Our CISOs were clear that their aim is not to impose security, but 
to support the business of the organisation. An important part of 
this role is in making arguments, or more formally “business 
cases”, for senior managers in an organisation. Senior decision-
makers are not interested in technical details, but in the business 
implications of security policies and the threats they aim to 
mitigate. The business case made by the CISO, therefore, draws 
on technical knowledge, but the essential point of interest is the 
financial implications of any security-related intervention. 
Security may in some cases have a low priority for the 
organisation [13], yet information security failures can cause 
stakeholders to question a company’s operations [38]. Ideally, 
there would be evidence to support any proposed expense, 
presented in terms that both IT professionals and financial 
representatives would understand. Decisions would then be set in 
a broader context, making security decision-making more 
inclusive. 
In reaching a decision on an aspect of security policy, a CISO will 
weigh up the potential consequences, not just in terms of security, 
but the overall business impact: C2, referring to password 
policies:  
“Because the security manager doesn’t just do security, 
he’s also there to support the business. So, he’s trying to 
make it as easy for the business to do its job, and the way 
to do that is to sell the business case. If you make it easier 
for the users, we can make it easier for the users but 
we’re going to have to increase the complexity, but, you 
know, if you explain the full picture, you’re going to win 
out that way.” 
Our tool aims to encourage CISOs towards new ways of thinking 
about security. CISOs are highly experienced; they are aware of 
benchmarks and can make decisions based on their experience or 
discussions with other information security professionals. Our 
tool provides a sound evidence base, and, by encouraging 
exploration, enables CISOs to review their decisions: C2, 
referring to policy decisions: “The journey is more important than 
the destination … you might actually find information that 
changes your mind.” 
In being able to navigate through the decision-making process 
with supporting evidence, it is possible that CISOs may begin to 
question the wisdom of “best practice” in terms of the balance of 
costs and benefits that it provides. Individual CISOs may then feel 
that they have the impetus to diverge from sector-wide views on 
usable IT-security towards an attempt to more appropriately serve 
the specific needs of their organisation. However, CISOs may not 
have such room for manoeuvre with regards to industry standards 
or sector regulations: 
C3: “[At the city council] we had to have a [password] 
reset policy where you could do it by answering 20-odd 
questions. Why did we have to put that in place? Because 
Government Connect mandated it ... we needed it to 
exchange ... pension records, and stuff like that and 
[National Health Service] stuff; ... you couldn’t just reset 
someone’s password over the phone.” 
Until usability is better-understood on a per-sector scale, CISOs 
would likely respect these mandates, not least because compliance 
is necessary to permit the business to operate. 
3.2.2 Trade-offs 
Decision-making invariably includes trade-offs between various 
costs and benefits. In the specific case of password policy, trade-
offs mentioned by our interviewees include: 
• If required passwords are too long or too complex, this
makes them more secure from cracking, but conversely
might force users to write them down as the only
reliable coping mechanism (this point is supported by
[34]).
• Users’ ability to recall passwords – and therefore, to be
less likely to write them down – is related to the expiry
time of a password; users must have a meaningful
length of time to learn the password before expiry.
Thus there are trade-offs between frequency of use, expiry time, 
password length, and complexity. Our interviewees spoke, for 
example, of increasing the length and complexity of passwords, 
but at the same time – to “give something back” to the password 
user – increasing the password expiry time. 
3.2.3 Risk Management 
Another clear finding from our interviews is that CISOs are 
engaged in risk management, rather than risk prevention at all 
costs (“it’s not the Crown Jewels”).  
One participant argued that in consumer web applications, 
passwords are often used to protect low-value information, for 
example when accessing a newspaper or crossword. He said there 
are similar situations in commercial organisations – giving an 
example where he replaced password authentication to a company 
intranet with cookies on users’ machines. 
However, our interviewees were clear that for employees of an 
organisation, unlike the situation in e-commerce, different 
balances of costs and benefits apply in different contexts. There 
are cases in which a breach could lead to serious loss of 
reputation, or involve external legal or regulatory authorities, 
thereby incurring high costs for incident management. Moreover, 
in principle, employees can be required to conform to the 
organisation’s policies. Enforcement carries costs in terms of 
employee goodwill, however, and overly strong policies impact 
on productivity – for example, in time taken to reset passwords. 
There is always uncertainty around the level of risk; in practice, it 
is never possible to identify the full implications of all security 
risks: 
C1: “So, if we could come up with a number for how 
secure are you, [because] that’s the Nirvana, isn’t it? If, 
you know, every manager says, “how secure are we”? 
“Do we need to be more secure?”, if we could come up 
with what that number was, what the individual 
components were, then, we’d have almost solved world 
hunger, in security terms ”. 
The best that can be attempted is to make reasonable estimates of 
key factors such as Annualised Loss Expectancy (ALE) [4]. 
3.2.4 Managing the Employees’ Security Practices 
A core aim of our tool is to ensure that an organisation’s security 
policies are usable from the point of view of those employees who 
are expected to conform to them. For this reason, the CISO’s view 
of organisation members and their security practices was of 
particular interest to us. 
As we detail in sections 4.1.2 and 4.3.2, the underlying process 
model incorporates the concept of user categories, which vary 
primarily in terms of the amount of time spent working in 
different locations, with associated security risks. Participants 
were generally favourable to this concept, but expressed the need 
to be able to parameterise the numbers and types of user classes. 
We discussed with them other possible properties of users, 
beyond location, in particular the different levels of access to 
valuable assets. However, we concluded from responses by 
CISOs that it would be impractical to link user classes to assets at 
this level of granularity; besides, it is rarely easy to identify the 
cause of a breach: 
C2: “in [a privacy breach around personal information] 
the ICO [Information Commissioner’s Office] can impose 
up to £0.5million fine ... and most fines that have been 
imposed have been nothing like that. In banking, fines 
have no real limits, ‘cos the FSA [Financial Services 
Authority] can impose what they like. The difficulty 
you’ve got, though, is, any incident that causes a fine of 
that sort of magnitude is going to be impossible to 
attribute back to a weakness in a password policy that 
you’re trying to model ... Most breaches are due to 
stupidity.” 
Yet different kinds of employee do have different levels of 
access: in a university for example C3, referring to the potential 
for loss of a university’s intellectual property, states:  
“our biggest risk, is round the staff area. Our students 
have a limited access to other bits and pieces, so. For 
example, they have no access to any of our financial 
information systems, or anything like that ... you could say 
the likelihood might be greater. However, the impact’s 
much less. On the other hand, the likelihood is more.” 
Employees also have differing levels of motivation and 
commitment to the organisation. Our participants were divided on 
the question of the impact in productivity losses resulting from 
difficulties in conforming to password policies. For one 
participant, this productivity loss is not a real cost to the 
organisation, since motivated employees will simply work longer, 
if necessary, or reorganise their time to accommodate the delay:  
C1: “If you’re in a large retail organisation, with, you 
know, tens of thousands of call centre operators, then 
productivity is something that really would affect you on 
average, whereas if you’re in an organisation of 
knowledge workers, where, actually they’ll just add an 
extra five minutes on the day if they’ve forgotten their 
password, … you’d be less interested in the productivity 
elements for those types of organisation.” 
Based on previous literature [15, 21] we argue that attempts to 
enforce secure behaviour in employees must be balanced against 
loss of employee time and goodwill. A key part of the CISO’s 
role is to encourage secure practices by all sectors of the 
workforce and promote a security culture. Enforcing unusable 
policies antagonises users and exhausts their willingness to 
comply, ultimately leading to rejection of security practices. We 
demonstrate through the tool design that there is a balance 
between compliance management [7] and enforcement, and that 
paradoxically getting this balance wrong reduces effective 
security. Our tool is a useful addition to the CISO’s armoury in 
achieving this balance. 
3.2.5 Supporting CISO Decision-making 
In supporting CISOs in making the kinds of decisions and choices 
that face them – by illuminating possible trade-offs, helping them 
to manage risk, and supporting a security culture – our tool aims 
to support decision-making, rather than to be prescriptive. This is 
in keeping with the essentially exploratory nature of the 
underlying model; it is heuristic, not in the sense of “rule of 
thumb”, but in the stricter sense of being a technique for problem-
solving. 
By providing an evidence base to support CISO decision-making, 
the wider aim, in our new paradigm, is to raise awareness of the 
costs as well as the benefits of security practices. The following 
short exchange in one of our CISO consultations illustrates our 
thinking as we discuss these aims with a participant: 
Simon: “[Our tool] says to ... naive security managers, 
“it’s not just security, you need to balance productivity 
and cost, here’s an idea of how that works”, and then it 
gets them thinking, and ... start to get them to educate 
themselves, as they try and make these decisions, ...” 
Philip: “It’s almost like a sort of didactic tool, from that 
point of view, isn’t it? In the sense that, … in small 
organisations … there’s probably some general manager 
who has this as part of their [responsibilities], probably 
hasn’t actually thought all these things through at all, and 
is completely unaware of these implications” 
CISO: “Actually giving them a menu of things that they 
can tweak would actually prompt that thinking” 
So we want to raise awareness, not only among dedicated CISOs 
but also for “part-time” security managers in smaller 
organisations, that security requirements which are unusable incur 
hidden costs which are borne directly by end-users and indirectly 
by the organisation [34]. Our aim is to expose these costs and to 
show how they impact on the achievement of organisational 
goals. 
3.3 Requirements 
Based on our consultations with CISOs and a review of related 
work, the following requirements have been identified as 
necessary to improve policy decision-making in information 
security management: 
• Expose Interdependencies: there is a need to represent
the dependencies that exist between information 
security policies, human factors, and economic/business 
concerns: 
o Relationships between concepts must be
captured in a more precise, quantitative
manner to facilitate exposure of their 
interdependencies; 
o The relationships between well-defined
human factors, economic factors and 
information security metrics should be related 
to the remit of the CISO. 
• Exploit Familiarity: presentation of interdependent
security, usability and economic expectations should be 
related to concerns that CISOs are familiar with. 
• Personalise Implications: Each organisation is unique.
Potential implications of policy decisions should be 
made relevant to the individual organisation or they will 
not resonate with the CISO, who would in turn be 
unable to take suitably proportioned action. 
• Augment Experience: any additional information for the
purposes of decision-support should be presented to 
CISOs in a way that supports, but does not presume, the 
outcome of information security management decisions. 
CISOs should be encouraged to explore their policy 
options in a way that augments their existing body of 
knowledge. 
• Provide Clarity: CISOs should only be presented with
decision support technologies that they can readily 
understand. 
• Empower Communication: CISOs should be able to
generate evidence that can be communicated to other 
stakeholders (e.g. Human Resources, legal, IT) to gain 
support or facilitate negotiation of their proposed policy 
decisions.  
The design of a policy composition tool should aim to address all 
of these requirements. 
4. DESIGN
To satisfy the requirements identified in Section 3.3 we designed 
the Password Policy Composition Tool (PPCT), a prototype tool 
focusing on the management of password composition policies as 
applied to all of the end-users within an organisation holding 
centralised IT system accounts. It is envisaged that such a tool 
could be used by CISOs to support them as they make decisions 
regarding information security policies. This interface tool 
envisages an internal systems modelling process, analogous to 
that detailed in [10], that must be communicated to CISOs in an 
appropriate manner. It also builds on previous attempts to 
integrate security and human factors into the policy 
implementation decision-making process [2]. 
The PPCT allows CISOs to configure core aspects of a 
provisional password policy to their own requirements, and to 
observe the quantified consequences of the policy management 
decisions that they may potentially commit to. 
4.1 Environment Assumptions 
If the PPCT is to be useful to CISOs, it must allow them to 
configure relevant aspects of password composition policy and 
provide an informative representation of the potential 
consequences, with which they can make more informed policy 
management decisions. 
We make assumptions about the organisation environment that 
CISOs operate in. This representation of the environment was 
informed by a model built with the Gnosis modelling toolset 
[20][43], which aims to represent the security, usability and 
economic tradeoffs inherent in password composition policy, 
modelling policy implications projected over a fixed time-span. 
The behaviour of the model was informed by a combination of 
empirical data, existing literature, and expert knowledge. It is 
envisaged that such a model may be integrated into an 
implemented version of the PPCT.  
CISOs might not necessarily consider how to articulate and 
communicate these interdependencies, and so a tangible 
representation proved useful for focusing discussion during the 
requirements-gathering and design consultation stages (Section 
3). 
For the purposes of our new paradigm, the implementation of the 
tool is considered to be a further piece of work. This in itself 
would present challenges, including how best to integrate the tool 
with existing decision-support tools already at the CISO’s 
disposal, and ultimately how to promote use of such a tool in the 
wider IT-security community. 
We focus here on developing a tool interface that can help to 
articulate usability issues in organisations in a way that relates 
them to the business and risk management concerns of CISOs. 
Within this brief we do not consider functional aspects such as 
providing guarantees of accuracy for the potential outputs of the 
tool (where those outputs may be produced by an underlying 
model similar to the Gnosis model we describe here). Model 
outputs may differ naturally between organisations and across 
sectors with differing threat environments. It would be necessary 
to capture these differentiating qualities when modelling the 
subject organisation in order to provide the CISO with 
information that they can act upon appropriately. 
4.1.1 Environment Behaviour 
It is anticipated that users move between different working 
locations over a predefined period of time, accessing password 
authentication systems at intervals to gain access to the 
organisation’s IT systems and facilitate working with electronic 
information assets. Password authentication systems and the 
associated policy decisions are intended to limit a wide array of 
perceived information security threats within these various 
locations, whether they are instigated deliberately by malicious 
outsiders or colleagues. Interactions with the password 
authentication systems have the potential to secure or exacerbate 
access to IT systems. The organisation’s IT systems and the 
associated authentication mechanisms are regarded as a single, 
centralised entity for simplicity.  
Here we limit the range of password-related security threats to 
password cracking (e.g. dictionary, brute-force) and guessing 
(“shoulder-surfing”, speculating). Whenever these threats 
manifest it is assumed that there is a probability of either of two 
distinct security breach events occurring: 
• Complete Password Capture (results in an unanticipated
and fully-exploited breach)
• Partial Password Capture (where successive captures of
the same password will eventually result in a Complete
Capture, depending upon the attributes of the password
policy)
Whenever a user authenticates to the centralised IT system, the 
outcome of the authentication process is assumed to be in one of 
five defined states: “Authenticated”; “Unauthenticated”; “Failed” 
(due to e.g. forgetting a complex password); “Resetting 
password”, or; “Locked out of account” (successive failed 
attempts). 
4.1.2 Environment Parameters 
A limited (but representative) set of policy attributes and 
employee attributes are considered. These properties are exposed 
in the PPCT design: 
• Four password policy controls:
o Mandated minimum password length
o Mandated password character-set composition
o Mandated password frequency of change
o Period of notification for employees before
mandated password change
o Number of permitted authentication attempts
before account lockout
• Three (default) classes of employee using passwords to
access organisation IT systems:
o Executive: works mostly in the office, but
also at home, with access to highly valuable
information assets.
o Road Warrior (i.e. consultant): typically in
transit between locations, but also works in
potentially insecure public places.
o Office Worker: works only in an office
environment, making up the majority of the
organisation’s workforce. May be subject to
attacks by industrial spies etc.
• For each class of employee we represent 4 working
locations from which authentication systems can be
accessed (Office, Public, Home, In Transit).
These parameters inform IT security management decisions by 
providing a simple representation of the balance between account 
breaches, end-user productivity loss and running costs (e.g. 
salaried time lost to security administration activities such as 
resetting a locked account) resulting from enacted policies within 
the defined threat environment. 
4.2 Overview of the PPCT Interface 
Configuration of the PPCT must not put undue expectations upon 
a CISO to interact directly with unfamiliar model technology and 
terminology. We herein examine the usability requirements of 
CISOs in terms of: 
• Communicating to a CISO a range of security,
productivity and economic factors and how they are
interlinked.
• Supporting a CISO in making decisions about potential
password policies, using the configuration properties
and output of any underlying model as evidence in
policy decision-making.
Consultations with CISOs encouraged the need to support CISOs 
during the policy decision-making process, e.g. C1: “giving them 
a menu of things that they can tweak would actually prompt that 
thinking”; 
C2: “Isn’t really what’s going to happen here, that the 
decision is not going to be taken by the software. What’s 
going to happen really is the thinking, of the security 
manager, is going to be shaped by the process of going 
through this.”  
The Password Policy Composition Tool (PPCT) design exposes 
policy-relevant details to CISOs, supporting exploration of the 
consequences of decisions within a limited view of information 
security specific to password policy management. 
The PPCT would be driven by configurable controls that 
correspond to policy management decisions. In practice 
manipulation of these controls within an implemented version of 
the tool would give direct feedback on the security, productivity 
and economic effectiveness of policy changes over a projected 
period of time.  
4.3 Configuration Properties 
Within the PPCT design it is envisaged that three distinct and 
interdependent groups of properties can be configured (as in the 
lower portion of Figure 1), each with their own separate tab in the 
configuration section of the interface:  
• (Security) Policy Properties: identifiable, quantified
password policy controls (Section 4.3.1).
• User Properties: different classes of employees come
into contact with an organisation’s IT systems within a
range of working locations as part of their typical
working patterns. Configuring representative properties
can help to generate results that inform how a
prospective security policy would affect a real working
environment (Section 4.3.2).
• Support Properties: these represent services within the
organisation that support working patterns and policy
associated with use of password authentication systems
(Section 4.3.3).
Note that here “Policy Properties” group aspects of information 
security policy that a CISO typically has the authority to change 
(within reason). “User Properties” and “Support Properties” are 
not necessarily under the control of the CISO, but are nonetheless 
characteristics of the organisation that can have an effect upon its 
security posture. 
Separating properties of the organisation into these distinct groups 
helps a CISO to understand the stakeholders affecting and 
affected by the security policy decisions they make. By changing 
interface controls in each of these groups and observing the 
results, a CISO can begin to relate observable changes in their 
provisional policies with the organisation around them. 
By presenting quantifiable values for the various controls and 
model outputs (Section 4.4), the PPCT design promotes evidence-
based information security policy decisions and accountability. 
With the tool design we also propose the capability to export 
model configuration parameters and output results to an external 
file, facilitating the provision of supporting evidence when 
discussing potential decisions with other stakeholders in the 
organisation. That is not to exclude the possibility that many 
stakeholders including the CISO could operate the interface 
directly at the same time in a workshop-style setting. 
4.3.1 Policy properties 
CISO-defined “Policy Properties” may come in many forms (e.g. 
changes in variable controls, application or removal of “active or 
inactive” controls). Here we focus on quantifiable properties of 
information assets or security devices that can be varied across a 
discrete range of values, e.g. the “minimum password length” for 
end-user passwords across the organisation. 
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Figure 1. CISO Password Policy Composition Tool (PPCT) 
Interface (showing the “Policy Properties” view and 
“Breaches” output). 
The policy controls are presented as “sliders” (as seen in Figure 
1). This simple mechanism promotes investigation of policy 
measures across perceived scales of increasing or decreasing 
security along different components of policy (e.g. “minimum 
password length”, “password complexity”). This approach also 
encourages CISOs to consider the manner in which individual 
policy controls can effect changes to security. Associating related 
controls in the same panel also conveys that policy controls are at 
times co-dependent or may be altered in tandem to achieve 
varying effects. For instance, given a particular PPCT 
configuration a user of the interface may find that a one-character 
increase in “minimum password length” contributes more to the 
potential loss of end-user productivity than a 30-day decrease in 
the “password change frequency”. 
Note that in the case of “password complexity”, we make the 
limiting assumption that there are a fixed number of character sets 
(e.g. lower case letters, special characters) from which passwords 
can be composed. As such the slider for this control indicates how 
many character sets must be represented in user passwords, and 
not necessarily what these character sets are. In reality the use of 
different character sets may result in varying usability for end-
users (e.g. if they are mandated to include numbers in their 
passwords, rather than special characters, to provide additional 
security). 
“Additional Information” accompanying each “Policy Property” 
control (the round blue “i” icons) can be used to provide 
information about the threats and vulnerabilities that each “Policy 
Property” should be used to address. These hints can also indicate 
any specific procedural guidelines or regulations that the control 
addresses (e.g. “ISO 11.3.1d”).  
Additional information then serves to educate novice CISOs as to 
the situations within which to use a given policy control. It can 
also be used to structure the accountability process, highlighting 
where a control applies to a specific industry mandate or 
recommendation (e.g. minimum required password length). Such 
information may be stored in an ontology (e.g. [1]), populated 
either by representatives of the industry or internally within 
individual organisations using external tools (e.g. [2], [3]). 
4.3.2 User properties 
Figure 2. The PPCT Interface “User Properties” view. 
The “User Properties” tab (Figure 2) facilitates definition of 
organisation properties that relate to a proportioned sample of the 
different classes of end-user interacting with centralised 
authentication systems within an organisation. 
Some of the content described in Figure 2 is highly sensitive (e.g. 
salary information). This highlights the need to ensure that any 
tool that gathers and processes organisation data to aid policy 
decision-making does not itself create a security vulnerability. As 
such the tool prompts the CISO for relative “proxy” salaries for 
each user class, making it unnecessary to retain sensitive 
information about actual salaries: 
C2: “because you can’t estimate salary, you’d be better 
putting that on a sliding scale to indicate, and reflect, the 
fact that you know it’s not going to be accurate. So, by 
design, what I’d want, is, where you think you can get 
accurate data, ... then you have numbers, and where you 
don’t think you can get accurate data, then, recognise 
that, demonstrate to the user that this is going to be an 
approximation.” 
Proxy salaries could also be based upon market averages in the 
“default” configuration, providing representative values that a 
CISO can use to form decisions in the first instance (before 
perhaps considering making any changes to more accurately 
reflect their own organisation). Salaries may be “banded” relative 
to each other, to remove the need to disclose salary information. 
Definition of projected earnings is optional, dependent upon the 
perceived value and working behaviour of individuals within a 
particular user class. 
In turn data such as actual salaries may only be accessible to e.g. 
the organisation’s human resources function. This then 
demonstrates that a tool to aid CISOs should ideally operate only 
with data that the CISO can gain access to (either directly or 
through legitimate channels within the organisation). 
A similar approach of switching between absolute and relative 
numbers can be used, where appropriate, to define the distribution 
of users within the modelled system. 
Finally, recall that we recognise different user behaviour patterns 
– which we characterise by proportions of time working in
differing locations, namely “office”, “home”, a “public space”, or 
“in transit”. Each such location has a different risk profile, an 
insight which resonated with our CISO participants. Different 
organisations take different views about the risks of, for example, 
mobile working: 
C3: “the in transit stuff’s interesting. ... the city council in 
[city A] and the city council in [city B] had two very 
different views. We had a proper [Virtual Private Network 
(VPN)], SSL VPNs configured in [city A], and if you 
wanted to work on the train on the way down, you could 
do. You just logged on. That was banned in [city B], we 
didn’t allow that. But, what’s the balancing act, between 
loss of productivity of a senior officer not being able to do 
anything for three and a half hours? ... and the higher up 
the organisation you go, the more they tend to travel.” 
Thus, two different views of the risks, costs and benefits lead 
these two similar organisations to adopt different policies. Our 
tool would account for the risks of allowing mobile working, but 
there are also productivity costs associated with not allowing it. A 
CISO would not necessarily need to configure the associated User 
Properties, and could rely on calibrated default controls within the 
underlying model. This model should represent a consensus view 
of a generic organisation as agreed by human factors, information 
security and systems modelling experts:  
C1: “a lot of the value here would be if … the average for 
most organisations is pre-populated, because this sort of 
tool would be very useful for the head of security who’s 
not doing it as a full-time role, … who’s not a long-in-the-
tooth who’s been doing it for twenty years and therefore 
has a lot of the gut feel for what these sorts of variables 
are anyway, so, a lot of the value would be capturing the 
experience of people, or through experimentation, what 
the averages are, having a database of all of that.” 
However, if the CISO wishes to see tool output that is more 
applicable to their organisation, the tool design implicitly 
encourages CISOs to gather the relevant information (likely by 
communicating with relevant stakeholders in other departments). 
4.3.3 Support properties 
Figure 3. The PPCT Interface “Support Properties” view. 
“Support Properties” (Figure 3) capture qualities of the 
organisation’s support services which, although external to the 
password policy, may nonetheless impact upon its effectiveness. 
These “Support Properties” are primarily related to the one-off 
and ongoing costs of IT security policy decisions. 
Specific to password policy, an organisation would ideally have 
helpdesk facilities of some description to address those instances 
where end-users need to activate, reset or unlock 
passwords/accounts. We make the simplifying assumption that 
there are helpdesk staff dedicated solely to answering password-
related requests from end-users within the organisation. From our 
CISO consultations, the cost of running a helpdesk function to 
serve password resets would be one of the major security 
expenses:  
C2: “when we were trying to reduce costs, we’ve always 
taken a very serious look at the cost of running a helpdesk 
to support forgotten passwords, and ... depending on the 
price of the product, it’s generally much more 
economical, to get rid of that helpdesk department of 
support, and move to automated password resets. ... you 
can cost [the staff] in the call centre, and you can cost out 
the software that you’re going to replace it with, and then 
you’ve got the implementation fees, and then you’re still 
stuck with that small residue of 5 – 10% of people who 
just can’t figure out the online system, and will call the 
helpdesk anyway, and, there’s quite a lot of business 
cases that have been done around this that I’ve seen.” 
Escalating helpdesk costs were the motivation for the study 
conducted by Adams  & Sasse [6]. But, as Adams & Sasse found, 
these costs result from aspects of password policy; our tool will 
model these costs and expose them in ways that are clear to 
CISOs. 
Organisations are increasingly moving to the use of automated 
password resets, typically using pre-registered secret words; 
where such systems are in place, password users are encouraged 
to reset their passwords without the intervention of the staffed 
helpdesk. We model both automated and manual password resets, 
where the relative proportions can be adjusted by a slider on the 
interface. 
Grouping “Support Properties” in this way gives a CISO a sense 
of how the infrastructure provisions within their organisation can 
ensure or threaten the success of both an IT security policy and 
the end-users within the organisation. Conversely the CISO 
should appreciate that an effective security policy does not 
overburden other functions within the organisation without good 
reason (or in this context, good business sense). 
4.4 PPCT Output 
The tool design presents the results of projected policy 
deployment as dictated by the controls described in Section 4.3. 
The output of the interface consists of: 
• Breaches: the number of breaches that would occur as a
result of the policy being deployed over a period of a 
year (the upper portion of Figure 1). 
• Productivity: the total number of working hours lost
over the simulated year across all the varieties of user 
defined as working within the organisation (Figure 4). 
• Costs: a breakdown of the support costs (e.g. helpdesk
staff) and projected losses of salary and potential 
earnings over the defined user classes (Figure 5).  
The output of the tool would be arranged in such a way that a 
CISO could “drill down” from high-level results to more granular 
results (an approach encouraged by other investigations into IT 
security management tools [8]). Where results pertain to user 
behaviour, output data can be examined at a level specific to a 
particular user class. With this, a CISO is encouraged to consider 
that different groups of users may have particular usability needs 
or may experience varying difficulties as a result of security 
policies. 
Varying levels of detail facilitate communication with other 
stakeholders according to levels of comprehension, but primarily 
support the CISO looking for particular categories of evidence to 
support their decisions: 
C2: “What people do, in business, is they tend to have a 
gut feel for the right thing to do, just from experience, and 
then they look for the information and the data to support 
the decision.”  
The manner in which output is presented in the PPCT design also 
promotes exploration of the “decision space”. The top-level is an 
integrated treatment of breaches, productivity and costs, 
represented as a 3D plane. It is envisaged that a CISO would be 
able to examine output datasets across this plane to support 
speculative policy decision-making, rather than having the tool 
provide an approximated “optimal” answer. This approach 
supports the preference towards augmenting CISO knowledge and 
experience rather than replacing it. 
Figure 4. The PPCT Interface “productivity” modelling 
output. 
The consulted CISOs all suggested that the tool could support a 
business case, wherein the tool’s output is used to justify 
expenditure for further security programmes. 
The intuitive correlation of the quantified properties of a 
provisional policy (properties represented in the control panels) to 
the quantifiable and identifiable consequences of that same policy 
(the tool output) promotes an approach of proportional security, 
and of articulating the effects of policy decisions: 
C3: “I’ll tell you why [I would use the sliders]. Because 
mine is only gut feel. Mine is non empirical evidence 
there, I have nothing other than my experience. And I’m 
only one person, who’s, admittedly, worked in IT for a 
long time, but, you know, I don’t know.”  
The effects of those decisions are communicated to a CISO with 
even sharper clarity with the potential to personalise many of the 
PPCT controls to a specific organisation. This would encourage 
individual CISOs to build on what the tool can offer so as to 
understand the organisation around them, in terms of security but 
also with respect to the usability and economic impacts:
C1: “Well, you probably want a starter for 101, which is 
somebody’s view, that you can tweak, … so that the naïve 
user can just use it, …  and the sophisticated user can 
amend it and tweak it.” 
Figure 5. The PPCT Interface “costs” modelling output. 
5. DISCUSSION
There are aspects of the tool design and the design process that 
warrant further discussion. In the previous section we detailed the 
functionality and interfaces of our proposed tool. In section 3 we 
described the results of consultations which we undertook, using 
scenarios and paper prototypes of our proposed tool. Here we 
present implications of our findings for the design of the tool. 
5.1 Tool Design 
CISOs lack the appropriate tools to consider end-user concerns as 
part of the policy decision-making process. Our consultations 
with individual CISOs suggest that they are keen for guidance and 
tools to rectify this, and that they see our tool design as an 
encouragement to consolidate usability and organisational 
security so as to support the goals of their organisation. 
Broadly, the participating CISOs were very much in agreement 
that the functionality of the tool was adequate to expose the 
interdependencies between security provision, end-user 
capabilities, and the continuation of business processes. We do 
however accept that this was a small group of CISOs, and are 
open to reporting extensions or revisions to the tool and 
associated model both for and from further CISO consultations. 
In particular all three CISOs were interested in the potential of the 
tool to make a business case – which they expressed as a major 
requirement (recall section 3.2.1). However, there were different 
approaches to decision-making, ranging from focused to more 
1 A reference to the British TV programme “University 
Challenge”; the idea is that this is a starting point, which more 
sophisticated users could build upon and refine 
serendipitous. Our participants differed in how open they were to 
revising their initial decision in response to insights gained 
through exploration of the tool. 
It is possible that in being able to explore the solution space, a 
CISO is free to selectively use only evidence which supports 
decisions that they have essentially already made in advance, 
knowingly or otherwise, according to their “gut feel”. However, 
by willingly using a tool such as the one proposed here to elicit 
evidence that supports their “gut feel”, a CISO must at the same 
time accept that they become accountable for the evidence that 
they use to support their decisions. 
Concerning the capacity to search for supporting evidence, 
participants particularly liked our suggestion of enabling a CISO 
to “drill down” into the results (Section 4.4), as a way of catering 
for different granularity requirements. CISOs in different sectors 
and different organisations have specific security and usability 
concerns, which may be served by additional levels of detail that 
assist in refining and understanding specific policy decisions. 
Participants made a number of specific suggestions about how the 
interface could handle both data which is known with a high 
degree of accuracy and other input data known only in gross 
terms. For example, sliders, perhaps measuring simply 
percentiles, could be used to register approximate values, or 
actual numbers could be used where these are available. 
5.2 Stakeholders 
The representation of policy and environment attributes is key to 
the success of the tool in facilitating communication with other 
stakeholders in the organisation. The tool is designed so as to 
formally represent and relate these attributes, which serves to 
remove ambiguity. This may prove useful when presenting a 
business case for IT security investment: 
C3: “You need to make it business, and this is what 
you’ve done, you’ve made it some that somebody with 
business acumen can understand what the impacts are. 
[Because] a lot of this stuff, you’re actually pitching at 
the chief financial officer ... that’s what they’ll be looking 
at”,  
C2: “So, a [good] security manager’s not going to ever 
just ... go and say, “right, we’re going to increase it, and 
you worry about the usability, and then we’ll have a 
conversation about it”, you try and present the options, 
and the business, just like you’re doing here.” 
CISOs must communicate policies to other stakeholders 
(including department managers and employees) to achieve 
actionable security measures. It is also necessary to relay policies 
to external auditors, regulators and perhaps even shareholders. 
Thus, a CISO needs to be able to communicate both with 
technical implementers and with budget-holders and other 
decision-makers who do not understand the technical language of 
IT and security [38]. 
In Section 4.3 it is suggested that the CISO may consider changes 
to “user” and “support” properties of policies. It is envisaged that, 
should a CISO decide that these properties need to be changed to 
effect better security, that they will contact the appropriate 
stakeholder(s). In doing so they would need to adopt a suitable 
method for articulating and justifying the need for any such 
changes (one that uses language that these stakeholders are also 
competent in using). The language used to communicate decisions 
across organisations should then be explored in relation to IT-
security and usability. 
There may be a need to approach these other stakeholders within 
the design process to assess their expectations of security. For 
instance, potential breaches may result in per-event or per-record 
breach conditions which legal representatives would need to 
evaluate, as well as costs incurred for investigating particular 
kinds of breaches: 
C1: “the impact isn’t only in relation to the value of the 
asset, though, it’s also the reputation impact, and legal 
impact, and ... regulatory impact, so...  you know, one of 
the impacts of failure could be that we lose our licence.” 
and in large, tightly regulated organisations, as C3 put it; 
“your cost of breach can go through the roof. [Because] 
if you’re talking to three accountants, your external 
financial advisor, and your company secretary, normally 
those people are only one or two levels below the board, 
and their time is, their time is big money.” 
Our tool does not as yet model breaches with this level of 
granularity, as the “complete picture” of breach costs is informed 
by many parties, not just CISOs.  
5.3 Decision-making Process 
The tool design, and indeed the underlying model, may implicitly 
incorporate assumptions about how CISOs actually make policy 
decisions. Appropriate decision-making strategies should be 
supported, and doing so should also limit the cognitive effort 
required by users of the tool to analyse complex information [18]. 
In this sense our consultations identified factors in the CISO’s 
decision-making process which we made efforts to support rather 
than supplant.  
The output of the tool may be more useful if exposed in different 
ways, depending upon the background of the tool user. For 
instance, breach results displayed over the projected lifetime of 
the policy would allow CISOs to identify temporal trends in user 
or system behaviour which are likely to impact upon the 
effectiveness of the organisation depending on when they are 
expected to occur. Exposing characteristics of the output 
throughout the model lifetime would add to the ability to “drill 
down” into the output to reveal further levels of detail. 
5.4 Organisational Culture 
We make no assumptions in the design of the tool about the 
working culture of the organisation that a CISO works in. For 
instance we do not consider application to specific industries: 
C1: “In utilities, in some bits of it, there’s not a lot of data 
that’s worth stealing, ... cos, you know, there’s nothing 
secret about it ... but in investment banking there’s a huge 
amount of data worth stealing, cos you can, you know, 
you can make money out of data but, the other risk of 
somebody maliciously tampering with data in investment 
banking is probably a lot lower. The impact of maliciously 
tampering with data in [utilities] is that you cut off the 
[service]. So, that’s two very different sets of probabilities 
for motivations for why people would want to steal 
passwords.”  
However, this could potentially be exposed through further 
analysis of the utility of security mechanisms, as embodied by a 
CISO’s preferences for security, productivity or cost information.  
The balance between the benefits (in terms of breaches avoided), 
support costs, and productivity losses arising from security policy 
decisions is made, in the suggested underlying model (described 
further in Section 4.1), towards the end of the mathematical 
process when the output from the model is applied to a utility 
function – see [10] for an explanation of how this is implemented 
in a similar model. The culture of the organisation, such as its risk 
aversion, the value of its assets, and the appetite for expenditure 
on security, could be reflected in our tool by adjusting 
coefficients of this utility function. This is noted as a possible 
future refinement for a working version of the tool. Such 
coefficients would have to be presented to the CISO in an 
approachable manner that enables rather than confuses them. 
The tool and the underlying model also make no assumptions 
about how people react to security mechanisms. For instance: 
C1: “In investment banking, where people are highly 
motivated, and they’ll get in at 7 in the morning and 
they’ll be there at 11 o’clock at night, it might irritate 
them, but, actually, you’re not going to employ an extra 
investment banker because 5000 investment bankers have 
to change their password”;  
C3: “the more complex the passwords, the more people 
write them down. So there’s a balancing act somewhere in 
between”;  
C3: “our engineers, or, our environmental health officers, 
these folk, many of them are keen on IT, they’re also very, 
very bright, they’ve got an interest, and they’ve done 
workarounds, you know, ... they’ve done it for the best 
purposes, but they don’t realise it’s just blown a hole in 
our security”.  
Also, for simplicity we assume that if a user is e.g. locked out of 
their IT system account due to a failed login, they are unable to do 
any work until the account is reinstated. This leads to discussion 
of reliance on IT systems, and end-users’ technical capabilities 
and respect for policy (as further discussed in [7]). 
5.5 Instrumentation 
Many of the parameters in the tool assume that the organisation’s 
infrastructure has been instrumented to provide the necessary 
values (e.g. helpdesk call duration, etc.). However at present the 
activities of end-users and security mechanisms as represented by 
the tool are informed by a mixture of CISO opinion and 
unexposed model constants. We envisage that should a CISO use 
an implemented version of our proposed tool, they would 
configure the parameters to better suit their organisation. With 
this, they may go one step further and seek more accurate data 
(for instance to support more accurate, evidence-based business 
cases), in turn instrumenting their organisation to obtain real 
monitoring data from relevant sources within the organisation. 
Concerning data breach information, it would currently be 
difficult to estimate the number of breaches for a given IT-
security environment configuration (concerning the implications 
of IT-security decisions and the root causes of security events, as 
mentioned in Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 respectively). However, as 
it stands the tool design acts to make explicit the link between the 
usability constraints placed on end-users and the security of the 
organisation’s information assets. Foremost, it may be necessary 
to explore how data breach information, be it simulated or 
evidential, can be articulated in such a way that CISOs can adopt 
it – both objectively and practically – as being realistic enough to 
support and justify policy decisions. 
5.6 How the Tool might be used in Small and 
Large Organisations 
We do not presume where the CISO is positioned within the 
organisation. However, in most large organisations CISOs have 
rapidly become part of senior management. In contrast, within 
small and medium-sized enterprises there are no dedicated 
positions for an information security specialist. For such 
organisations, the tool might be a repository of evidence which 
can partially overcome the lack of specialist skills. Conversely, 
larger organisations, with a dedicated CISO, might use the tool as 
a base which could be parameterised to reflect their actual 
situation. For organisations of any size, the tool can be populated 
with accurate figures for parameters in the underlying model 
where they are available within the organisation, or where this 
proves difficult the default model values can be relied on to 
provide output that still informs the policy decision-making 
process. 
6. CONCLUSIONS
Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) and other IT security 
managers are usually not aware of the effects that their security 
policies might have on the abilities of end-users within the 
organisation to use IT mechanisms effectively. These security 
managers must cultivate an awareness of how usability enters into 
the interdependencies between security provision, productivity 
and business process requirements within their organisation. We 
investigate the capacity to actively inform CISOs of these factors 
during IT security policy composition, by way of a prototype 
Password Policy Composition Tool (PPCT) user interface design.  
This tool facilitates exploration of changes to quantified password 
construction policy mandates, associated supporting services and 
end-user working patterns, providing feedback as to the impacts 
of these changes upon each other and the security posture of the 
organisation as a whole. The usability of the tool is also 
considered, as it must support exploration of policy choices, 
provide clarity, and facilitate communication with other 
stakeholders within the organisation.  
Discussion and qualitative evaluation of the tool design by 
consulted CISOs demonstrate that it intuitively conveys elements 
of end-user usability, security and economic concerns within the 
information security policy decision-making process. 
We intend to consult with additional CISOs to progress an 
implemented version of the tool. Any prospective implementation 
of the tool could be repackaged to be generic beyond password 
policy, so as to cover other aspects of information security with 
human and economic factors, e.g. endpoint protection policies. 
It may also be conceivable to change the focus of the tool from 
CISO-oriented policy composition towards guiding and engaging 
end-users during password creation and password use, thereby 
shifting the emphasis of the tool to security awareness and 
education. 
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Appendix A 
A1. Scenario 1: Password Cracking in the 
Cloud 
“A senior manager of your organisation has come to you having 
read an article claiming that password cracking attempts can be 
run within “cloud” computing environments, making it easier to 
find the financial and computational resources to brute-force 
attack a password. 
The senior manager does not trust the precautions you have taken 
to protect the central password tables or passwords in transit 
between user workstations and the authentication systems. The 
senior manager then demands that you take action to strengthen 
the organisation’s employee account passwords from the threat of 
exposure through this “cloud cracking” method (with the 
assumption that such an attack can be tailored to target enterprise 
authentication systems). 
From reading the article, you believe that in order to keep 
passwords safe from cracking using the “cloud” (at least for the 
foreseeable future), there are three password options available to 
protect your organisation from such an attack. 
• If mandated passwords contain both lower-case letters
and numerical characters, maintain a minimum
mandated password length of 12 characters.
• If mandated passwords contain lower-case letters,
upper-case letters and numerical characters, maintain a
minimum mandated password length of 11 characters.
• If mandated passwords contain lower-case letters,
upper-case letters, numerical characters and special
characters, maintain a minimum mandated password
length of 10 characters.
Your organisation currently mandates 8-character passwords 
consisting of lower-case letters and numerical characters, so any 
one of these suggested mitigations represents a potentially 
disruptive increase in security effort for staff. 
Further information associated with the original article suggests 
that using cloud technologies, an 8-character password consisting 
of lower-case letters, upper-case letters and numerical characters 
may be cracked within 100 days. With this you may also wish to 
explore your options for the frequency with which staff have to 
change the passwords they use to access accounts on your 
organisation’s IT systems. 
You must investigate the options available to you, while 
considering the effects upon staff productivity and supporting 
costs of increasing the effort they must expend to maintain the 
level of security you believe is appropriate.” 
A2. Scenario 2: Effects of a Hot-Desking 
Policy on Password Policy 
“The lease on your organisation’s HQ in Central London is 
coming to an end, and the leaseholder wants to significantly 
increase the rent.  This has prompted your CEO to hire a Space 
Utilisation Consultancy to assess how well the available space is 
used. The consultancy’s report states that on average 37% of 
desks are not occupied during the hours of 9am-5pm. 
Your CEO has calculated that your company can give up 3 of its 
6 floors, saving the company £1.5 Million in rent p.a., and is 
determined that the company should achieve this through “hot 
desking” and by abolishing all meeting rooms (except for the 
board room).  At the moment, the company has a traditional 
perimeter security, with no remote access to systems, except for 
sales staff, who are able to enter their sales into the company’s 
systems from home via a dedicated web service.  A review 
conducted by the head of departments in HQ reveals that to 
achieve this, the company has to make the following changes: 
• All sales staff (20) will no longer have any desk space
in HQ.  They will now exclusively work from home or
access systems on-the-road.  Apart from entering
orders, this involves access to inventory and price
information, quotations, customer databases.
• 75 employees who previously only could access
systems from within HQ will now have to hot-desk and
work from home.  For informal meetings and/or when
they need to be close to the office but no desks are
available, they will have to use coffee shops close to
HQ, using remote access systems.  They will now have
to share computers, instead of each having their own.
30% of the previously office-bound staff have said that
they will not be able to work from home and so they
will have to use coffee shops or other public places near
to their home or the office.
• The 5 board members will have to book space in
meeting rooms for formal meetings in commercial
centre, and access systems remotely to present relevant
information.
Major stakeholders have been given a limited amount time to 
lodge any objections to the “hot desking” initiative. You are in a 
prime position to inform the CEO of any serious security 
implications that this initiative may introduce. As such you should 
be able to explore the security implications of these new working 
conditions and report to the CEO any findings that you think may 
influence their final decision.” 
A3. Scenario 3: “Password Authentication vs. 
Fingerprint Readers” 
“A new fingerprint-reading technology has become available that 
is cheaper to purchase than previous incarnations. It may be 
worthwhile investigating the possibility of replacing your 
organisation’s password authentication systems with this new 
biometric-based authentication system. 
The cost of each fingerprint reader is still being negotiated, so you 
do not need to consider it in the model. The manufacturers have 
also mentioned the possibility of being able to negotiate discounts 
if the central fingerprinting system and associated employee 
fingerprint readers are bought in bulk for use across your entire 
organisation. 
However, there are a number of issues to consider in deciding 
whether to purchase a completely new fingerprint authentication 
system for your organisation: 
• There would be no requirement for staff to recall a
password when authenticating to the IT systems. This
might result in fewer helpdesk calls.
• Systems staff will have to visit every desktop computer
in the organisation to install the fingerprint readers and
associated software. You plan to do this on a rolling
programme over 6 months. There are 2000 desktop
computers in your organisation; assuming 2 staff people
work weekends, each could do 5 per hour or 35 per day,
70 per weekend, equivalent to work spanning 28
weekends.
• All employees will have to enrol their fingerprints with
the system. Existing staff will do this on the first
working day following installation of a reader on their
desktop computer. New staff will enrol on their first day
of employment. This can usually be done by the
employees on their own, but you expect that 25% of
them will have problems doing this, requiring a visit
from a member of the helpdesk staff.
• The fingerprint readers you are considering have a
typical false negative rate of around 5%, and a failure
rate of 10% per year, related to how accurately people
were enrolled initially. This is analogous to the problem
of users re-typing or forgetting their account password.
If a password reader has failed and a member of staff
cannot authenticate, that would require intervention by
support staff to resolve any such issues. However, with
fingerprint readers, all such faults are likely to require
physical intervention by support staff, resulting in
longer fault resolution times. There are then typical
support costs and procedures associated with
biometrics, just as there are for password authentication
systems (in the form of automated or manned
helpdesks).
• Fingerprint readers can suffer from false positives,
where an operator of a fingerprint reader may be
authenticated as someone else; these readers have a
typical rate of around 1%. However, a targeted attack,
for example using a silicone copy of a genuine
fingerprint, could have a success rate of 5%. This is
analogous to the threat of passwords being guessed, in
that the authentication system believes the operator and 
the owner of the authenticated identity are one and the 
same (much like when someone else knows the 
“something you know” that constitutes a user’s 
password). 
• Employees with no one fixed working location will
have to guarantee that any portable fingerprint readers
they use (for instance as found in some makes of laptop)
function correctly outside of the organisation’s
premises. Faults in authentication systems for
biometrics have much greater implications than
problems of passwords being forgotten. However the 
security benefits of using biometric authentication in 
public places over password authentication are obvious. 
It is your responsibility to investigate whether your organisation 
should introduce a completely new fingerprint authentication 
system for all employees’ IT accounts, replacing the existing 
password authentication system. 
As part of this investigation it is worthwhile to consider whether 
the existing password authentication policy can be altered to give 
comparable security, productivity and cost advantages to those 
offered by the fingerprint system.”
